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CHAPTER

J.

INTROD UCT IOI~

The Federal Reserve Syste.!il is considered by many
people to be a mysterious organization because .coat paopl.e havo
only a vague idea of the functions end operations of the Federal

Reserve System.
Tho purpose or this otudy is to study the organization
of the Federal Reserve Syotem and ·t o investigate the effects that
the system has upon the American econooy.
In

sea.king

the origin of the reform legislation known

as the Federal Reservo Act of 191;, the ooonomic historian usually
begins with the year 1893.

It was that year toot the panic and

the depression brought to American bankers, businesmil8n, and
statonmsn a realization of the waaknssses or the American banking
system~

In a very real sonse, the people of tbis country began

to look in the direction of foreign systems to discover the
reasons for their superiority.

The com9lacenoy whioh had mrkod

American banking thoUBht vas severely shaken.
There was in operation a ao-oallod state banking system
and a national banking system, but the fact that thero wore two
banking systems rondered iclpossible the existence of that degree
of crganlsed and coordinated regulation end practice that the
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term syatwn implies. The otate banks obtained their authority
from the state governments in which they were located, and
although there was considerable unifor.lllity aa to the banking
lave of the several states, the dll'ferences prevented an identity

or

policies and practice that is noceGsary to a 6.ltooth '1orking

n!ltional eysttm of banks.

Tho national banks \:ere cb.nrterod under

one ooeio law, but each one was more or loss autonomouso

No cen-

tralized authority could co.mpel theoe banks to cooperate for the

col!.mQn good of all the banks or tho public.

Moreover, nation'-\l

banks vere given permission under certain oorrlitions to alter

their policies and practices so as to compete on equal grounds
with the state banks.

rules

or

While these departures f'rom the general

the national banking la'W's were comparatively minor, they

did contribute further to the lack of uniformity that already
existed.
So.me of'

the more obvious dofecte

am

woaknesses re-

latin8 to banking before the passage of the Federal Acts

or

1913

wel'e:
1.

Inadequate cont!'ol of bank rosenes. Tcia
weakness resulted from the practice by national
and state banks o! koeping only the po.rt of
their reserves on band that vaa required; the
rost was deposited in nnother. b.1nk, wh:ch, in
turn, might send part of it to still anothor
bank. Whon lru.•ge ouno of .lil:mey vere called
for, purcboaere of aecuritles or commodities

3

v~r e often forced to sell their holding in
euoh large QLlOunts that prices on the exchange
market Yere adversely affected~ If fo1· no
other reason than that it produced a feeli~.g
of general wicerta1nty es to the prospects of
business, the depruseio11 of tho organized
markets had its ;.-opercunsions in .ll'.any phases
or bu:;iness.
2o

Inelaatfoity of Note Issues~ 1t was often
suid that instead of being elaotic, tho
volUDm of ll3tional oonk notes was often perversely elastic that tho vol\l!ilS fluctuatod
d.i.reotJ.y opposite to ·t;he 11eeds of the public

for m.oney.

3. Lack of a National Cleru.·lng Syotea--prior to
the esteblishmsnt of the Federal ResoI'vo
Syotom in 1914, there vas no nationBl organuatiou th.a:. could be used fo?:• cJ.eez:ing
cheoks. As a result, each bank !J.!!de tho
clearing ~ranswnent that U considered the
most convenient without regard to the intElrests cf the drawr.ra or payees of checks
e!ld other !'legotiable instr~nts. 1

Those ooncl!tiona produced a dile~ in financial

conditions in the United States. To further illustrnte the
situation, I will go further JJ1to the dilemimi.
Whon banks throughout tha country were pi-cosed for
funds by their depositors alrl borrowers, the damnd for credi t

converged on a few banks situated in the fiz:umcle.l cen·t.era.

1 Jamoa Harvey Dodd -0.nd Carl
~ nr.rJ. ~2fil.i.9Jl.A, 2m edition.
Publishing Company, 1957), !>• 40.

w.

Hacek;

KQ.Qn.9.JlP..,.Q ~ -

(Dellau: South-Western
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In ordinary tim3s the dCC':\rrl ws not excessive, for t-1hlle

.,0Jll9

out-of-town banks would be drm-ring down their balances., others
would be building theirs up.

But at t.liooa when bus1nfJss wac:

unusually active e.n:l tho public wo in ru)ed of large:t" on?unts

of currency for hand to hand circulation, tho do:.nnd. tor monoy
ou city bonks boce.me "Widespread and intense.

Eaob year credit

demand waa particularly strong duri.ns the crop IlOVinfl oeoson.
At such ti.mos ronka all ovor tho country Yould cnll on banko in
thE> firu:mcinl conters to oupply fwrl:).
BccaUGa no fo.cilitlos Yore ovailablo for provi.cline ad-

ditional fume, including currency, the crodit situation would

bcco.:w vc1•y tight .

To CEiet the out-of-tovn demnd ror £undo,

the banko in tho £.ir.anci.ol conters 11ould soll secll!'itios and call

loana or \iould refuse to 1·onov exiatin,z loons or oakc now onos.
A::i c ro·sult, security prices vould fell, loono \Jould have to bo

liquidated; borrouing from lxmka aa voll as othor lend.ors would
bocom!J difficult and intorost rateo would rioo sharply.
fQ1,1

Every

yoars, difficulties of this kind would lead to a J:Wnotery

crisis.

The problen had been umor public discussion nod
lJtudy for a long titlo uhon, i'ollawiD3 o crisis of unuaual

severity in 1907, Coneress appointed a Natioll/31 ~onotary Com.mission to determine r1ho.t should bo done.

After sevoral yea.rs

5

of thorough eo11sidoration1 Congress eventually adopted !.-9gislation
embodying the ~esulto of study by the conm..taaion sud other authorities.

This legi6lnt1on was the Federal Raservo Act.

It boc8.!119 leu

on Decwube1· 23, 1913, and prmrided r.iachit~ory by uhioh ,,.tu.,ying

de~nds for c:i.·cdit end money by the public could be i=:liJ.
/ill of the principal netj.01w hr.-;-() :eserve bankn~ so.&2Stim!,e

cal1od c~ntrr.l banks, to parf'ol"i:. 1'unetlonn co:-rer:;poming to those
or tho Federal Reserve System.

In England it is the Bank of EDg-

latld, which has been in existonce since too ond of the seventeenth
century; in Franc~ it is tho Bank of France, established by
Napoleon I; in Cano.tie it is the Banl: of Canada, which 003cm opera-

tions in 1935.

In the United States there is a regional system of

tvelve Federel Reserv8 Bankso

th.i-ough the Board of

'£heir e.otivlties aro coordinated

Governors 1n

lJashi.Dgton.

Before we go into tha organization of the Fede~el Reserve
System, it would be proper to deal with the functions of the
systam.

The principal funa~ion of t:1e Fedornl Rc ...orn: Syot00 is

to regulate the flow of credit and money.

Othar i'unotions include

the porf'or.mance of services for the member bsnke
Reserve System, tha United States Govornmant,
Theao services include the following;

am

or

the Federal

tho public.

handling LlSW)Or bank

reserve accounts., furnishing cu-rrency for circulation and JllSidng
cur!'cncy ::;hipmni.s; facilitating tho clearanco nnd collel~tion of

6

checks; effecting telegraphic transfer of fu:d~; cctlng aa £!seal
agento, cUDtodians, and dopositcrieo for tho treas,!!"y ond other
nove:i.·nnental SJ;enoico; tmd collecting cm intcrproting lnfor.ma-tion ben!.'~ on tb., eoon::.w.c and credit s::..tu:iltion.

the Federal Rcsarve eXflmi o

0

i:i

In addition

and ~uperviBea State .ismber banks,

obtains reports of coniitiono from thCl:I., ond cooperate~ Yitb
other supervisory eu·thorit:!.ec i11 the clevolop.t!ant of polioioa
C.'.>ndu.civo to a systOC! of atro?JJ 1ndividu:il bruilis.

OHAP"l'ER II

CRGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSl".r;M

The purpos3 of the Federal Resorvo Act was not to
create or provide for en entirely nav eystem of COJW118rc1al bankso

Rother it Yas to create facilities that would enable the eziuting banks to ovorcom or rG!llove the defects in their practices

thet hod been genoral!y recognieed by all etudenta of banking.
The Federal Reserve System is co.:lposed of five

1. The Board of Governoro
2.

The Federal Open Market Co!n!ttee

3. The Federal Advisory Council
4.

Tho Fed.oral Reserve Banks an-1 their

branobeo

5.

M<lmber banks of the Federal Reserve
System

The Board ot Governore

or

tho Fedoral Reaorve System,

ao of February l, 19.36, supplanted a similar supervisory agency,
knOllll 110

tho Federal Reserve Board, whioh

the original legislation of 1913.

Yee

provided for in

It posoessea mny specli'ied

povers aa well as the authority to oxerciso gonoral supervision

8

over the entire ayatem.

The board is composed of seven ~mbors

who am appointed by the President with tho advice ani conoent
of the Sen~te.

The term of office ia fout'teen years, although

the original members or the Board of Govornora wero appointed
for "staggered" terits--one for two years, one for ro~r years,
one for six years and so on-so that one mrunber would leave

office every two years.

A member who serves a full term of

fourteen years ls not eligible for 1·oappointmsnt. The President

designates on9 momber as ohair.msn, ond one ae vice chair.man;
these of.t'ioea are held for four year terms, with tho possibility

or

reappointment.
The Federal Opsn Mu-ket Co.c.i;nttoa is an lilj>Ortant

agency in the etru~ture of the Federal Rooervo Syste.m, since it
has the pover to determine when nnd in what volut'l!) the tvelve

reoerve banks will engage in tho ~urcbase an1 esle of seouritieso
Such purchaae and sales are now recognized to

moans at the dis9oaal

or mone-tary

or

oo

tho most iapor-t,ant

the reserve authorities for the control

expansion arrl contradiction.

The Federal Opsn M!lrmt Cp.1Il2!ttoe 1s

llO'l;I

composed

or

the

sevon .msmbers of the Board of Governors and five represontatives
of the reserve banks.

Ons reprosentative ia chosen annually by

the Fedoral Reserve Bank of New York ond ono by oach of the f'ollouine
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groups of reserve benl:s:

Booton» Phihdelphin

Cl,;;veland arr. Ohicae;o; Atbntap Dalloa arrl

st.

am Riohm.olld;
Louls; and

Minnenpolis, Kansas City and San Franciscoo The ooo~d of
directo!'a of ench reserie ~nk has ons vote in c'.loooinz the

representative of its group, and only l'E>Gerve bank pl"esidonto
are qualified for eleot.:on.

Anot!-ie:r president or vice-president

is chosen by each group as altern4te.
Any membar of tho

Feioral Open Mar.k,-lt Colll'llitteo m~y

be electei ae it3 chai.'t'onn or its vice··ohair~n; these of.t'ioials

ara chos~m by the members et the i'irat t:19etin.g each cpring to

serve £or the current year.
Fedora l Advisory Council

The Federal Advisory Council is ooznposed of twelve
.1119.111bers, one chosen annually by the board of direotors of oeoh

reserve bank.

The members are usually distinguished c~9rcial

bankers vho are chosen bacaw.o or their promin:mce in the representative diatricts.

The 1·esa1·i;o b&nks lilSY voto them o

atipulsted co.lilponaation, vi:th liho approval or the Board of Governors, but tho offico is priCl.arily an honorru:y one.
Federal Reservo Bnnks and Branoboo
The principal oporatine units of the Federal Resorve

System, other than the member ban!ca, are the tvelve reserve banka
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and their branches$ A recervc bank is loc3ted ill an .inportant
city in each of tho t'welvo districts o:r.-ieimlly delimited by the

organteation co.mmittee,

am

eoma twenty other cities ere dlrectly

served by branch banks established to facilitate the operatic~
of tbt, parent reserve bankso Each bank orJ.gioally given a tvonty
year charter by the .federal 6overM.Ont, but tho cbru:tera vere made

·or

indefinite or perpetua~ duration by logislntion adoptod in

1927.
The Federal Reserve Act requires e~oh reserve bank, at
the tim':l of itc oreaoi1Jetfon to have o :nniJm.lm subscribed capitol
of $4,000,000, divided into oha:!'as of $100 per valuo.

The stook

is oubacriboo by the m,;,i:ibor bankn into on amount equnl to six per

cent of their 0\1n capital and surplus, although only ono-half of
each subscription nu.st be paid in, the balanc~ is subject to call.
The Federal Reoor\'G Act authorizes the Resorvo banks to
!)SY

a ou'!l.ulativo dividend of six per cent upon the paid in atock

held by the member banks.

Under no circumstances, can the stock

holding !llaClber banks enjoy a return exceeding that rate .
Board of Directors

Each ro.sorve banl: is managed by a board or n1no
directors who ore chosen in pm:t by the Board of Govornorc ond
in p::rt by tho raember banks.

Three of the board me.obarc., known

as Class A direotoro, arc dostenatod cs tho represantat1vea of

11

the

bankinc

interests of. a reserve diatrict; nnd three, the

Cless B Directors, represent the co.!tm.8rcinl, 1:mluatrial nnd
r.griou.ltur~l interests of the districto Di:ectora of these two
types are elected by the .c.eobor banks.. The Class B directors
r.,.~st not bo officers 1 directors, or Cl!lployeos of nny other bonkine 1ns-:,itnt!c... •

'!he Closs O directo1•s, also three in :uunbsr,

are appointed by tho B~rd of Governo~a to represent the public
interest.

They

!ill.ts...

havs been rostd nts 0£ the!::: respoctivo

d..'..otricto fer at least

t\10

years proceeding their a_ppointoent.

The te:.ci of offioa for all directoro io three years.
The chief oxecutivo o!!icer or a !oderal reserve
bank is tho presicont; ho is chosen for a te~m of five years
by the osnk' s board of directors, subject to th opproval of

the Board of Gova~nors.

One er more vice-preoidenta &!SY also

be selected, arrl the appointm'lnt of the i'irot vica-presidont

is also subject to the approval of tho Board of Governors.
Branch~s

T'l!enty-four branchos of tho fodernl rosorve ore nw

in operation.

In several iD.Dtnnces, brancheo wore octablished

appera~t.l y to assoogo tho inju~y felt by aom mjor cities
becauso they uero not decignatcd as the location of p:n-ent bonka;

a!:ld in somo cases, the!= estebliah.i;wnt waa a.oro clearly dosigned

to provide b:;ttor facilities to serve tho nenber benka. Branchao
are especially useful iu spcooir-s the clearing and collection of

checks, particulal'ly in the districts 'tiest of the Missisoippi

River; ,1hich coi;;iprlse vaot areas.

The bioncb.oc nro not lndependent

institutions, they may be t.houeht of r.o divioions of thou- p.:1rent
bankoo

Pom:irs of tho BoGrd of Governors
Some of the powers other tt1ar. thoso already m.entior.':Kl
are aa follows:

The reaorve banl:s are required to subm5.t to

the Board of Governors a veakly statewnt of their.f:n~ncial con-

dition. The board

reqtti.ra then to vrito of! any assets it

.iae.y

considers vorthlo-ss.

rha ::eaerva banks are exaLlined periodically

by a group of eY.aW.nars, urrier tho direction of tho Bonrd of Gov-

ernora.
M:,obor Banks

All national banks are req_u.il•cd to bo 1nsmbe1•s of the
Feder~l Reserve Syatelll.

Incorporated otatg banks, inclu.dinz

comc1ercial oonka, m.ntunl eavine bsnks, trust c0t1panloa and induatrial banks (such aa Mo;;;<r.l.s Plan Com.panios}, lltmy voluntarily

join tho Fcdoral Rooerve Syate:l if they nro able to satiafy the
qualifications for .c:.onbersbip.

Othor otate chartered institutiona,
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auoh es eavingo and lean associations, sales finen~e comp3niea,

are not elieiblo for mombarship.2

2a,aymond Kent, ~ IJ¥1. Uftnk~ng.
atd Company, Inc. , 1951), P• 80.

(tiew York: Rinehart

..

CH.APTER III

THE mAMS AND WAYS OF INFLtEUCOO THE
IJ,tRICAN ECO?-T:>MY
Tho Feder1.1]_ Reserve bas tln•ce

c nera.]_

moons of

influencing over eil cred:t a.nl .'10notary conditions. Theso
gonorel !:Wano are discotm'~ o_peratfono, open m':l.rke-1. operations
and ch.Gngos in reoel·ve requirc.mntn.

each of thosa

ll'.)D.!W

The write1· feela that

r:llould be disoussed individually.

A short

discusaion on select!¥ credit regulation ani ~oral ouasion
irill al::io bo prosontcd.

Discount Operationu
CO!:'.:nOrcicl banko have the p::irllcto of borrouing from

tho Fod.eral Resci·ve Br.nk.

This lllElY bG dor. by two "WOYD.

Firat,

the bank my rediscount one or its own customer ' s notes uith a
Ro::;e1·ve Ban'.c and second; it raay eivo its mm uoto to a Resorvo
Bank

WJ~

,t:>apor from its ~n holdinCs oa collateral.

aorvlcos the Federal Reservo

obarees

For thoae

inter ::it ate rate known as

tho discount :-ote. The disco.mt. rcte lo s:'.!;z)ly tho intoreGt rate
cherged by ths Reserve BnnJro on their bans. When diBC.)unt rotes
nro L"lcronecd thio inw:oooos the cost of acquirill3 re ...ervoo by

borrowing, i.hcreao a decre2sc in discount i-ctoa make it oaoier
fo!' a ba.r..k to ccqulro reserves thia tmy o

15

These diocou.nt rates e.re or<lln~ily initiated by the
board or director& of the t.welvo federal Rese1·ve b..ctnks, but are

r..ubject to tho epp:-ovcl of ·Lhe Board of Gcvornoro~

These rates

ai·e submitted. to the Boaro of Govcrnora every fcurt~en c!ays £or
opp:io"l:a.1.

Tho hoe.rd could requ..i.l'c this to

oo

done ofte11~r, but

a.cos not under ordilnry circuas:tancoD.

DLcount rates can differ st the vario1.1.s Reserve
Bcnks and they coneti.!.ms do.

B:i.t they lU'e usually the ~'.}, and

the occasi".>nal d:i'ferencea are usually aooll and sho,:t-livod.l

Opon lilr.ket Oporatlon~
It r:.3y bo oaid that. open Lmrkat opc:,rationc differ
radically oa a L:.':)aus of influencing ~ho flc,w of credit and monoy.
They differ in that open !ll!l!'ket oporotions aro initiated by the

Federal Reserve ani not by mmber banko.

In tho caao

or discounts,

the Federal Reoorve establiabec a diacour.t rate at waich Jl18lD.bor
bar.ks may obtair.. Rosei.·vo Bank credit. r or cppropriate uses if'

they etpply fer ito

The decision ic J.ert to me.o.bcr banks.

Open e!\rket operations present a differont ~ituation.
The Federal Reso1-ve can p~o0ecd of ·its c~n accord to buy or sell

---------

¾.eater V• Chandler. IQ& ~9,no,aj.ruz 2-t Mru.12:£ D.m. ila.nl;ing.
(New York, Hai·pcr and Brotbora, 1959), P• 105.
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socuriti.c::: !r. tha open .t.3.i·ket. The:;o operaticr.t: teko plcce
only if the Ro:3e.rvo Bor.!.: !'ools that tha flo;r of credit i3 too
~luggish or too ac'..ivo~

Ga-:err:.:::znt bon:l:: era tho principal l:i.n:i

of pcpeI: with which tile Fode:::-al P.oservoJ can ro:paud their loens,
inviltrtr:cnts

mu

depo!3its.

The proccdrn·o takes place ln ti.lie ma~or.

I!' t!1e

Poo.e1·al Renal"'.ro decido::: t.:, 1·odueo re::::01·\"cs and thuo rostrain credit

an:i ~he crO"Jth of the noney supply, it solls goverllll'..ent cacuritias
to a '\c~lo!'.

This dealc1• my hold thw:i or seU ·l:.hor.i~ 'Whon the

doalor pays for the.::1, ho drc:ua o chock on ao!J.9 mnoor bank in
favor of a Fedorzil Rosorvo BElnk o.nd tho Rosorvc Bank decl.ucta the
ru:i.ount frOJn tho roaervo dopoait of -th!s bank. The lx:mkfl ·then havo
to adjust their londing policioo to their rctlucod dopoaits and
crodit will bo restric·'..odo
Fode~ol Rosorvo open .tilarkot operationo w-o controlled

.

by tho Federal Opon i-!slrJ-;at Committee.

The com.,.uttea is oo~osed

of the seven members of the Board of Governors, the president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and four other prasidonts
of Reserve Banks.

This grou9 meats in Washington nt lonst

every three weeks, and its J!18mbers cc~unicnta with each other
more frequently, often by talephono.

This group prescribeo open

market polio1, eettiIJB the aims and prescribing in a general woy
the nature end .magnitude of tho opo!'ations to bEl tnkon.

17

Two as_pocts or P3rts

theao o_porationo ahoald be

(1) The opsn market trensoctions

emphasized.
but

or

occR't' 1n !le'IJ

Yoi·L City ,

tbeir offocts oro by no ooans confinsd to this area.

(2) The most pouorful offeots of tho Fed.oral Rosorvo pu.rohcses
and aelea ora achieved through their impact on tho rost:irveo ond

lending pen; r

or

the banks, whether these operations are with

banks or others. 2
Changes in Resorve Roquiramsnto

The c.,;,ans diooussod oarlier, discounto and open market
operations, by the Fcderel Rcsorvo Syntem edd to or subtract
frOJr. the funds available as mmber bank reservos. When :r:eserve

requir0Jll8nts are cbangoo it does not directly alter the total of
reserves~

Instead it changes the proportion of a OOLlror bank' s

deposits that wst be held as reserves uith e Federal Roserve

Bank. Therefore, tho liquidity position of the bank io affected,
thua affecti113 tho ru;iount availoblo for loano or invoswnts.

An illustration will probably make the situation
cloerer.

If the rnserve requir0lll9nt neainot demand deposits ia

15 per cent, a r::ullbor ban!: .munt keep in its r servo account uitb
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n Federal Reoerve Ben.le $15 out of every $100 of its oun dopoo1te
and baa CS5 to lend or invest.

If' the 1·asorve roquir~nt is

10 per cent, it n'3eds to koep only ,.,10 uninveoted and 890 to

len:i or invoato Therofore, a change in reoer~o requir~nto
changea the rw.es under which a b:l~ must operate.
Sines changes in reoarve requiro!.13nts affect ot the
sru.ne tico and to tho sam..? extant, all me.moor banko subject to a
change in rosarvo requireoanto, they ere considered to oo a

potent instrur.iont. \-lhon tho availablo rosorveo or liquidity of
a bank are incroaaed or docroased, it lmo a prc:19t oftect on tho
i•c_te of bank lending, invoot~ and in the rate of .monetary ex-

vanoion provided. thoro is no chango in the banks attitude
to-,11ord londin3.

Saloctive Credit Regulation
Tha pO\/er s discussed so far are knoun as gonoral lilelans
of regulating the t' 10'.r of credit and money.

In addition to thoso

:m~ana, the Fodoral Reeorve has spocial povars to reguli:ito tho

credit term.a on which transactions in stock .i::i.a.r.kets are firulnced.
At tic-3s it hoo been authorized to proscribe terms on which conGUIJY.)r

credit and certain real estate credit could bs ext ndad.

It Rlso bas ooon empowered to encourage lenders to rectrict
uthor typos of crodit volunterily.
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Selective credit instra.~onto prescribe the termr:; on
whioh londera DlJ.Y maka certai.n typee

or

loons, resordleas

or

the

reserve position of CQ!IU';lJrc.f.Cll bruilis.
Fe~ exo.r..ple • 11' ono area is developing an un."iealthy

use or credit an1 other credit is normal, i.hc over all con~rl.)ls

would harm o·t;her acti"Titioo. So tho Fede2.·al Resarve can use ita
p were of seleotive regulation on that item. Thie will prevent
the nor~l areas fro. bciJ.1« lmr~ by vegu.lationo

The forocoi.Dg bao been a c.iscussion of the ~thoda
and instrll!.18nts UGc1 by the Fodoral Rcoorve SyatO!il. to regulato

credit and nonotary policy.
So.me

ocono!!liet have claim.9d that tho Federnl Reserv •s

polioloa hnvo i'ailod in their attel!lpt to provide

ot'.'t'

economy vith

the nooded checks and oontrole as fer ae the money supply 1c con-

cerned c

Tboso critics _point to ·t.hs fact that if borrowaro wnnt

to borrow badly onoUGh, they are wilU.D8 to pay alo.oot any in-

terest rate ao long os it la lOller than the marginal efficionoy

of capital. These critics also point to the fact thot ti' the
prospoots for profit using borr0v1ed fQMB is not good th n, then
it is dll'i'ioult to induca theci to borrov ragardleoa of bow low

tho intorest rates are aet.
Those critics fail to take into consideration, hcrw ver,

that thoce ropros nt extrema conditi~no. A aignific.:iut o

nt
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Yes

osde by Blodgett in his book, .Qm:. ExR4nd!:98. Egon9:!Di1:

By themselves any one of the mtho:ia
of rediscount rate changes, open market
operations, or ch$nges in interest rates
might be inadequate to check the expansion
of the money supply in a period of prosperity.
However, if the Board exeroi68d all or most
of its po~ors at any one ti.mo or successively,
they ahauld be sufficient to prevent the
overexpam3ion or the money supply under any
ordinary coooition. Of course, the problem
of applying the powers at the right tlma
remains as does that or getting the Board
of Governors to use it~ pwers regardless of
political or international influ.ences.3

As a commont on changes in reserve require!Il9nts, it
Jli~ht be said that it ie omployed very infrequently, end to

brinB

about relatively large changes in the reserve position of banks.
This is in part duo to the fact that it has acquired the reputation
of boinc more like an ax than o n scalpel." That is, it is considered to boa powar.f'ul instrumsnt of control. The banks in
large cities complain ahout the way tbe 1·osorve requiremsnt
system is eot up.

They feel that they are at o disadvantage

because they must keep suob e large share of their total asooto

----------Jaa1oh 11. Blodgett, ~ Expanding
Rinehart and~Cocpany, 1955), p. 598.

Econw.

(New York:

1n non-loaning form..

that som.e

years~

typ:3

The criticism of the system is ao great

of refor,7l vlll probably comcg in the nax-1; !61:J

T.hoy will probably bo in tho fora

or

\mll'orm rcqui.rom9nts

against drun.nni deposits regardless of tho looa~ion.4
As an analysis of discoWlt =ates, it

iA

held by

OCl.'!19

authoro that this poHoy ls .not a por.f'oct ono and that the oon-

ditione of .Arn.,;,rican banking do not oake fo~ its perfection.

They

say that £or it t::> wo,:,k porfectly tvo con11tiorw mu.st ElXist:
{l) The Reserve Bank JJUc!st otend 1·oody to lond freely at its
ootabliahed rate, end uses no o·ther rationing .r::evhod to regulat-e
tho voluc.;) of loons.

(2) Com..~rcial banks mast have no inhibi··

tlons against borrawing from. tho central bo.nk.

say that these oondit!on.~ do not exist.

These crltiaa

They say th3t the central

bank uaas othor nnthods eni that banks hove inhib3.tiol18 aeainst
borrowing frOlll the central bank.

They Gay that there 16 o

tradition ngai.~st borrow:tns continuou~ly to oxteni its ovn

Other autllo:-s point out tho fr.ct that it is vrone t.o
dis.mies c~·mgoo in discount rates as inoffective and usebss.
T!1 ey ;J.:!.nt out thnts

(1) Chaueos in discount rotes are an

-¼.ester V. Chandler.. l'.ht1 t,oonomieQ .2.t M9mZ .ruir! ~ ~.ng.

(New York:

J-:m•p:.,r

o.m Brothers,

1949), P• 66.
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efff.lctive vay of onnouncirlg to both the bonk cind th9 public
tho direction of Federal Recorve Policy.

Opsn mrl:at operationo

are u-ot as veil undorotood. a& changes in disc::iunt ratesv

inoronseo tho bargaiuiilg pow~r

or

(2) It

lend.era relative to borru..1in3.

A b:mkor can o.rg~ 1 "I hnva to charGe yc,u r..oro becaUDe I havo to
pay corfJ £or vhat I borrov. n5
Tho crcu..19nt gooo on ond one It £light be e&id that

it ic good to toke o critical look at Federal Rcoerre polioieE
am poaoible improvCC!Jnto.

It mgbt further be stot~ that tho

Foderol Ronarve bas bad e E.rtabilioing effect on baukillg in
Al!.loricn.

M-:>rol Suaoion
The Rossrvo banks do not mrely estoblish disco.mt
:.-aton and then lend peoaivoly and uithout cOL'l_ploint to all banka
uho vlsh to bor.rOil.

Instead, thoy often use moral aWla!on end

othor diroot action to influ nee not only tlm

ot.mt or bank

borrO"diDCJ but alao tho lon1.ing and security purchoaing polioieo
of b!lni:r..

nt t:i.J:19n, they uco publicity, iutorvlava, and other

dovicee to porou.9.dO ~ to borrO\I loao a?rl to t1';hton their
c!'odH polioios.

On occasiou, as in 1947, and 1951, they e n-

oouracod bnnlra end other lendoro to follOil voluntary credit

---------------
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reotraint ~•progretW to curtaUn non-ossontial oredit. 6 On
othor occaai~na, they attempt to elicit a oore liborol credit
policy on the part or banko using them to liberal.t-ze their lend-·
iDg and to .uss Fodoral Rosorvo Crodito 1f' necesaery.

In addition to credit !unctions, tho Federal Reacrvo
per1'orms certain services

or

which tho .lll.-~st iJ!l.portant are:

hm:rlllng ng:ibor bnnk ri:,serve nccounte; furniching currency for

circulation; t'acllite.t,.ng the al oe.ranee and. collection of c-..hecks

and the transfer 0£ !wns; act1Dg ss fiscal asents, custodians,
end depositories or tho United Stntoa Ga-.rernc.'3nt; anrl n~kine

available to the public the economic and fitmnciel 1.nfornntion
that servos to guide System Polley edmnistre.tion. Tho Syotea
al.so perform.'1 importnnt supervisory functions that help to keep
individual .Gt-t.t'lbor b3nkll in aou.ud con:lition and to oointain tho

atrensth of the banking syote.u oa a Yhole.

6r.eator Ohnndl.er. lh!! ~~ al itmu ~ Md.nr..•
(llov York:

Harpor an:l Brothol'c, 1953), .P• 440.

CHAPTER N
THE EFFECTS OF THE FED3RAL RESERVE

SYSTEM Oll THE Al£RICAii ECONOMY

The writer fgels that in order to get a oomplsto
underst ndir..z of the offeots of the Fc1eral Roaervo Syste~ on
•
the AD.crican o~onocy, on ll!.•.tatrntion should be made. ThiEl
illuotr tion ohonld clarify some of the offeots of credit and

conetary changes on the American ocono.my.
To tho porson who is unf'amilinr with oconaoios and
fiscal policy, it might sees that tho more oredit and .cionoy
people have the better off they a.o.

The fact ios hcwvor, that

it 13 not tho n\.1.Clbsr of dolla1•s available but what they will buy
that is important.
People asually have different tests of vhether they
have ouough monoy. To the manuf.'acturer, the test of whother
ho has or can borr® at a reaeonable cost enough dollsra to
buy his ra-w .raaterials, pay tho wagea of his employees end m:ike

other payments necossary to a profitable level of operation.
The far.mer, the merchant, and the banker havo si.w.lar tosts.
To the consumer, the teat is whether he has or

C8ll

borrov onoueh

.monoy on credit oharges and ropayoont tor.co that ho can r.wet to
buy vhet he naods.,
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In an econo.my such as our .hlnsrican ocono.-v, ono that is
dynamic and growinfl, enough money would have a different maning
i'rOlll that or another econoey.

In a dynru:rl.c arrl growing econony

it t1ight bo said that enoueh moll3y and credit is that ac.-:>unt which
vill help to J!l8into.'..n high and steadily rising levels of production,

e1Uploymsnt and consumption, and to foster a etsblo valuo for the
dollar. 1'ben orodit beco.a:as Wlduly scarce or excessively hard

to get and costs too .111uch, facto~ies and stores may curtail operations and lay off employees,

Smaller payrollo ~an hardship for

workers who curtail their purchoses; merchants feel the decline
in trade and reduce their orders !or goods.
find it nacessary to lay off .more workers.

M!lnufacturera m!lY
A scr ious depreaoion,

unomploymsnt, and distress may follow.
On tho other band when credit is excesaively abundant
and cheap, the reverse of these developm9nts, an in:f'lationary
boo.111, ooy develop.

Tho hazards of such a condition are vividly

disou.ssed in a booklet published by the Federal Reserve Syst0.111.
They are as rollows:

An inCl'oasa in the vol\.me and flow
of .monoy roanltlng froa an inoroaso in
the sunply and a·1aibbil1ty 01' credit,
couoled ·11th a loworiDg of' .its ooet,cannot
in ltsolf add to the country' s output. If

oonatlmCI'EJ havo o~ cnn borrow ao much .lllOn'ly

that they t~y to buy more goods than can be
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produced et plants runn.i.rt..g at capacity,
this spending only bids up prices and
&skas the same amount of goode ooat more.
If merohs.nta and othors try to i~Cl·eese
their ~tocl:G ao es to p ... oi' it by the rise
in p~ices, they bid up prices further.
Manu.faoture::.-s F.':\y ~·y to ox.9tu~ theil·
plantain o~de~ to produco more. In doing
so they will bid up :\J1~e.:ee't. ~cteo, wases,
and tho prices of cor..struc~ion .cn.teriala.

In tho end they ~aiso their ovn 003ts.l

Tbeae nro the uays in uhioh oxoensivo changes in credit

and money can affect the American econo~. This illuGtration
although oversimplified in that it doea not include all the factors
that at'!'ect the lovel of e~onomic ectivity, snt"Ves to show what
will happen .ll', on the one hand, credit

:.s

too soarc&

01•

hard to

cet and too·dear, or if, o~ the other hand, it is too plentiful
or easily obtainnble and too cheap~

It is by influenc!P.g the

flow ot credit, with resulting effects on the flow

or

money, that

tho Federal ReaerYe influences the Amerioan econ~.

Practically all the monsy UEed 1n the American econ01ey'
reaches the peoplo, dil.·eotly or iniirectly throll{lh banl:n.

They

JIJB.Y receive their pay in cash, but the employer who pays them will
have cashed a oback at the bank and SDB.Y have borrovod from a bank

li3oard 1Jf Governors, The Federal, Reserve System, flllllopes
IW!i [,unctions. (Washington, D. C.: Board of Governors, 1954), p.9.
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bGt'ore moking up hie !)'.lyrollo

Thoraforo, the flm, of oonoy i.n

tho country depends mainly on the ability

or

b!lnks to mat the

credit and m.oneta~y rcquiromonta of industry, trade, egrioulture,
and oll the other sootora of economic lii'o.
Tho ability of banks to .m'3et the credit and nor.etary

noeds of the people dopor.dc on tho runount of rasorves the banks
hav •

This in tur.n is affected by Foderal Reserve operations.

Banko can oxtend credit to customers or invest t10nsy in securities
only in proportion to the ~eservoa at theiT dlspoael.

The vay the

systeo or roaervo vorks, ond the fact that Wld.or it tho banks con
lend in tha aggregate soverol tic.so as .c-:ich

reservos, will bo discUBsed later.

QB

thoy have in

What noeds to ba understood

first la that the Fcdoral Reserve: thoush influencin,s tho avoil-

abllity and the coat of addition.al bank reserves, c~n influonce
tho aoount of credit the banka r:.9.1 axtond to the publia throuah

loans and invoatmanto, and thus influonca total £low of credit
and monoy.

Tho rocerve position of banks affeoto directly the

wlllingnans of bonka to o:>.-tond credit and the coat, or rate of
interest -which borrowars will have to pay to obtain it.

The

Federal Reaervo thUB has the p01Jor to influence tho country•a
credit situation

am,

oinoo oonk bans on1 inveetmnta arc tho

~in a,;sete that serve as baokln,g for dep.:isita, its J!lOney
suppl., .
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The Federcl RoDorve is net tha only f3ctcr ~ffect1ng the
cred.:.t an:i r.:.-:>ll3y su!)ply.

Tho othor fact.>ra include, govo:-ru:tmtel

polioiss in regard to expend.itU?·es, tn~s, an:i debt, tho dfotribu-

t!on of inco;3l$ atWI18 di.fforont gro~pa of the population, the
bargaining strength and pol!.cies of 11U1nage.mr;nt, labor, agrioultu:-e

an~ ether sectors of the econotl.j; tho courao o! foreign t:-ata end
f orei.en ilrreetmet ·;, • aIXl tho prospecta for ponca or wnr.

ThWJ tho Federal Rec-e::vc alono onnnot nssc:..~e favoreblo
ccono.m..!..c conditions nor can ~t diroct ~hothor credit cbull flow

into partioul.a!' chcnnals. But it con &f.t'ect. tho c;enor::il flow of
credit ai:Y.l

LlOOOy

co eoonomlc con11.tion!: ch:mze ond. thaG holp to

counteract inotobility reGulti!lg frcn othar forces.

The supply

of mon,;,y end ct·edit, and the incontives to uce credit ond money,
uhiab the Federal Fesor,;e does influonc~, era indispoucable
factors :1u .o.odern ccon~.!'lio life.
Fad.ere! Reserve .ir.fl~nco is cmrtc1 pric!.'lrily through
the credit .m.ar.keto Unliko the orsanizoo otock or co.:::.r:iodity
oar.kets, the credit n'lr.b::it has no speci.flc plcco

or business~

As

a lll!.\tter of £aot ~ uodern mear.s of ocz::mm.icaticns m:ilie tho country
practically one Mtiona.1 credit l!!lrkct in tho !inenoiug of largo
transactions.

Well-ostobliahed bor1·0'l-1e1·s with high credit ratings

oan obtain bank or other lonnD on .much the aa.t!e conditiono in ono

city as L."l another, for if londablo fwr.ls ara aoarca an1 costly in
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one cantor, tht. eupply tond:::i to be roploniahcd from othe!.~ centers

vhcro it !s mere abundant. Relativoly snw.11 trnnce.ctio~z orisinating frcLl local noeds am reproc.entod by loons based on oloso

contoot vit.h loc&l conditions aro hendl.G~ by tho r:any 1·aBioml

crodit m1rkoto.

The rates of interest charged aod other ccn-

ditionc io theoa locel .oar.ket~ r..JJY vary sor:awhnt tron place to

plnco, but they ere, nor.'3thelasa, rolai;ed to ous anothsr.
Contacts of these local oorketc uith tha national narlr.ot,
and thu~ vith one:, another, arc 001-utnincd ln purt, i.;hroueh oolancoa
kopt by local oonkc uith ctty corrcnpondonta. They aro also

fecilitat,od throueh diroot credit contact ootvoon city banks
and l.nrge out of town buoinesocs; through a 11:ltwork cf brokerage
am othor J.oool contact.a vit,h tho large reg1oMl all'i natio!l!ll
ar.vh'lg institutions; th't'ough thn relationships ba~.Jcon local

dealora in invoatt1.Snt socuritiec an1 the underuritings hou:100
and otock exch':!oSC Jllrulborc or tho fin'lnafol centero; and through
tha JllQr.hani.sm of the Fodoral Reoervo Syat~..

Fu:tda fr0:11 the local

11a.-:-.kots aro likely to fJ.0-.1 in end out of tho fiooncial contora
with changes 111 local de.l&lnd. for. credit.
Thl·otigh this !.lov of. f.undo, bt\nY.s in all parts of tho

country, aG well aa othor firulociol inntitutiono, are 1n conatent
contact t.rith the ootionsl mrkoL.

the national

LUU'ket

The rvJV0!:1811t 0£ !'wrls between

and tho local market ia no longer disruptive
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a~ it froquently was before the organization or the Fode~el
Reservo Syste..

The Roserve Banks csn supply additional f'tmds

to the market if necosaary or can absorb excass f'ulYlso
Podei·al Resorve actf~ns affectiI)g tho credit mar.knt

ere directed fo:r the mont port to the fu.nctioni.ng

or banka.

Such aat..:.oDo i.J!f.'lu.once tho n!!rkt>t oo a Yholo, houcvor, sines
they o.££eot th a.vaili;:bility of .fun1s to other lending institu-

tions, their attitude toue.rd _proapect.t-vo bo:-rovo:o, rurl their
aprraical

or i..~eatmtmts. Tho nttituia or londere tward loan

e.n:l ir.vostneJ1t oppo::-tunitios is sonJtill'3o re!'cn:-re1 to aa tho

-i.on3 of the mrket. Wb.on bank ,:osorve i'undfl ere n'Jl"e readily
evo.ilablo, b:'.ll..lro l~nd and inveot !!Oro f'rcoly, as do other
f .i.lmnc.ial institutt'lno; and the tone of' tho mnrkot io esay o

benk reserve i'w:rla are

J.'31313

r" i'l.ily avallabJ.o, tho opposito

situation ,prevails en:l the tono of tho nnrl~t io t!ghte2

2
,l!,jg., P•
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When

CHAPTER V

As the foregoing chapters have explained, the basic
pwore or the Fed !'al Reaerve relate to credit ani Jlomy.

They

are credit po~Je?'s in that they direotly eftoct the ability of
oon:m.aroial banks to au_?ply fu...."Yis to the credit m·n•kot and in-

d~ectly inflW3ncs the uillingneao of otbor lenders to eUJ>ply

!unis.

They are mon~tary powers in that they affect tho size

of the money supply, ~hich conaiata in part of currency e.n1 in
much larger part, deoond deposits.

The Federal Rese~ve Syste.m.vao o~tabllohed to correct
oortain def'octe in our banking and uonetsry ayate.::i. These
dofects uere disen".>ced ao 11 1nelastic currency" an1 ccatterocl
bank reservoso

Tbo eyate.o. pro.~ptly cleared the uay for 001·roct-

ing these dofects.
From the beginning the FcdEll'nl Reserve System hos pro-

vided 3laoticity. Tho oystom for doing this hao worked alm.?ot
eutomtically.

It has also corrQcted the condition known as

scotterod bank reserves.
Fodoral Reserve Syote!ll vaa establiohcd in an era when
the country' s finnncial probloo.was one

.

or scarcity of

croiit

and coney and rigid limitation on expansion. To a oonsidorable
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er.tent, because of a loris poriod of internatio~'ll political
unssttle~nt, involve!llant of the United Stntes 1n two major
wars, and the inflow of gold folloi.,ing two world-tJido ocono.mic
depreasiona, the financial problem with which the systom has

been concernsd has been one

or

obun1ance and. noed of restraint.

The Federal Reserve Systo.m is a unique banking mechanism,
esssntial to a qyMmic, privnte enterprise economy like ours.
It ls especially adapted to a honking oyatem with .lll3ny iniepon-

dent bankin{: units, today nll'llbering som 15,000 ot' which nearly
7,000 aro System mgmbar banks.

Through its twelTe Reserve Banko

and their coordination, through tho Board of Gove~~ore in Washington, tho System is designad to combine private and public
velfare. Experience hat1 shown duri.Dg the System' s four decadoa

of operation that reserve banking ia e potent arrl indioponaable

1nstru~9nt of public policy, that under conditions of peaco it
can facilitate ooonomic stolility end progress; and that in tho
event of the throat of war or war itself, it can be an iuvalWJblo
aid in facilitating tho f.L oncin,g ot' oooential prograos and in

alienating rosulti.ng economic diaturbanceac
Tho Federal Reserve Syoto.m is e sorvioe institution to
the nation.

The more than 250 directors of the tvelv Reaerve

Banks and thoir tvonty-fou.r bl·onches, tho 20,000 officers arrl

othera who work in tho.r.i, aa well os the Board of Governoro aid
i t s atoff i n Washington, are all sorvinz as trueteeo of the

nation ' s cconOLJY.
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